One Year After The Los Angeles Fires, And The Failures Are Still Burning

Twelve months after the Palisades and Altadena fires, the failures of prevention, response, and rebuilding are impossible to ignore

This special column, recognizing the one-year anniversary since the start of the devastating Los Angeles fires, is available to all readers. Normally, our afternoon content is reserved for paid subscribers.

🕒 7 min read

The Anniversary We Should Not Ignore

One year ago—January 7, 2025—Los Angeles watched entire neighborhoods burn. Homes were destroyed, livelihoods were lost, and thousands of residents were displaced. For many families, the disruption has yet to end. Rebuilding remains stalled, insurance disputes continue, and large portions of once-stable communities remain empty. Any serious review of these fires must begin with sympathy for those affected and recognition of the hardship that continues today.

But commemoration without accountability serves no public purpose. A year later, the evidence points to a more troubling conclusion: the devastation was not solely the product of extreme weather or unavoidable natural forces. It reflected failures—systemic, institutional, and in key respects preventable.

That conclusion is uncomfortable. It is also supported by the record.

The Fires That Should Never Have Spread

The most serious failure occurred before the fires reached their worst stage. Reporting and post-incident reviews indicate that the Palisades fire appears to have reignited from a previously contained blaze that was not fully extinguished. Proper mop-up procedures are not optional. They are a core component of wildfire prevention. When they are not followed, the consequences can be severe.

In Altadena, where the Eaton fire burned, investigations and reporting have raised serious questions about whether aging utility infrastructure was adequately maintained despite long-standing fire risks. Utility providers operate under an explicit public-safety obligation. When that obligation is not met, the costs are borne not only by residents directly impacted by the fires, but—under recent state law provisions—utilities may now be permitted to seek recovery of excess wildfire costs from customers who were not impacted by the fires.

This raises a broader policy concern. When public and private resources are increasingly redirected toward expensive mandates to reduce carbon emissions, basic safety functions risk becoming secondary. Environmental ambition does not substitute for competent risk management.

When Heroism Had to Compensate for System Failure

The second failure involved the emergency response. Official reviews and media reporting document communication breakdowns, dispatch delays, equipment shortages, and staffing constraints that complicated an already dangerous situation. Firefighters on the ground performed professionally and courageously.

Individual heroism, however, cannot compensate for institutional weakness. Emergency systems exist to function under pressure. In this case, those systems repeatedly failed to perform as intended.

The post-fire response compounded the problem. The Los Angeles Fire Department issued an after-action report that sharply criticized aspects of the city’s response to the crisis. Before its public release, the report was edited by city leadership to soften that criticism.

A document intended to improve future performance instead became a tool for minimizing institutional exposure.

A Year Later, a City Still Frozen in Place

The final failure was political. Mayor Karen Bass and city officials pledged swift rebuilding and regulatory flexibility. One year later, much of the Palisades remains stalled in administrative limbo.

Approximately 6,800 homes and businesses were destroyed. As of this month, 686 building permits—roughly 10 percent—have been issued, and fewer than 400 properties are under construction. Entire blocks remain vacant. In practical terms, the overwhelming majority of affected residents have not begun rebuilding.

Promised fee waivers were not sustained. Homeowners report six-figure permitting and compliance costs before construction can begin, along with prolonged delays across multiple city departments. Overall in Los Angeles County, fewer than a dozen homes have been fully rebuilt.

One year after repeated assurances of urgency, progress is measured largely in explanations rather than results.

The Politics of Low Expectations

These failures are not confined to a single incident or official. They reflect a governance model that prioritizes coalition management over measurable performance. Political durability in Los Angeles increasingly depends on satisfying organized interests rather than delivering outcomes.

Public-sector unions remain central to this structure, providing electoral support in exchange for compensation increases, work-rule protections, and insulation from scrutiny. Fair compensation is not the issue. Accountability is.

Fire prevention, emergency response, and rebuilding are not ideological exercises. They are operational responsibilities. Governments either perform them competently or they do not.

So, Does It Matter?

The past year stands as a serious indictment of Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass’s first term. Leadership is properly judged by outcomes, not intentions, and the outcomes following these fires are difficult to defend.

This assessment is not abstract. I was born in Los Angeles, spent the first two decades of my life there, and my family still lives in—and owns property in—the city. The stakes are personal as well as civic.

Voters should understand the implications clearly. Reelecting Mayor Bass would signal acceptance of the decisions and results that followed these fires, from prevention through recovery.

Past performance remains the most reliable indicator of future behavior.

Cities do not decline because of bad intentions. They decline when accountability weakens, and competence becomes optional.